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aComputer Systems and Information Security of KubSTU, Krasnodar, Russia
Abstract
We present a new approach to constructing of pseudo-random binary sequences
(PRS) generators for the purpose of cryptographic data protection, secured
from the perpetrator’s attacks, caused by generation of masses of hardware
errors and faults. The new method is based on use of linear polynomial arith-
metic for the realization of systems of boolean characteristic functions of PRS’
generators. “Arithmetizatio” of systems of logic formulas has allowed to apply
mathematical apparatus of residue systems for multisequencing of the process of
PRS generation and organizing control of computing errors, caused by hardware
faults. This has guaranteed high security of PRS generator’s functioning and,
consequently, security of tools for cryptographic data protection based on those
PRSs.
1. Introduction
PRS’ generators play an important role in building of communication with
cryptographic data protection [1, 2]. From the list of known attacks on informa-
tion security is important type of attacks, based on the generation of hardware
errors functioning of the nodes forming the binary PRS [3]. To ensure the re-
quired level of interference and fault tolerance of digital devices developed many
methods, the most common of which are backup methods and methods of error-
correcting coding [4]. However, allocation methods do not provide the required
levels of fault tolerance for restrictions on hardware costs, and methods of error-
correcting coding is not adapted to the specifics of construction and operation
means of data protection (MDP), in particular, the generators of the PRS.
2. Analysis of attacks based on hardware faults generation
Currently, the following types of attacks on sites of formation of binary PRS
are considered (attack on) [5]:
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• analysis of results of power consumption measurements;
• analysis of results of operations performance duration;
• analysis of accidental hardware faults;
• analysis of intentionally generated hardware faults, etc.
The last two types of faults are not investigated enough currently and thus
are threatening to the information security of the functioning of modern and
perspective MDP. The origin of those attacks lies in the use of thermal, high
frequency, ionizing and other types of external influences onto MDP for the
purpose of creation of masses of faults in hardware functioning by initialising of
computing errors.
Hardware attacks can be divided into two classes:
1. Direct hardware attacks. The consequences of those attacks are fail-
ures of data protection tools. There is a method of analysis of the conse-
quences of those failures. These types of attacks mean that in distortion
in the certain places algorithm of transformation, which results in com-
puting errors. Those errors can lead, for example, to repeated generation
of the elements of PRS or in generation of faulty elements of PRS, which
is unacceptable
2. Attacks on post failure recovery means. Some systems do not recov-
ery means. If the system protection is destroyed, it is impossible to restore
the operational mode. That is why such systems need to have means of
protection against attacks of the malefactor and to support the possibility
of updating the security system without stopping the programme running.
Attacks, based on errors generation by means of external influence are highly
efficient for the majority of currently known and used algorithms of PRS gen-
eration. It is known that probability of error generation is proportional to the
time corresponding registers has been affected by the radiation, if the registers
are in favourable condition for error occurrence, and to the quantity of bits,
in which the error occurrence is expected. The most widely used and proven
means of creating PRS are algorithms and structures — Linear feedback shift
register (LFSR) — of PRS generation, based on the use of feedback functions
of logic [1, 2].
The structure of LFSR is determined by the forming polynomial:
D(χ) = χτ + χtl + . . .+ χt2 + χt1 + 1,
where τ, ti ∈ N and characteristic equation based on it:
xp+τ = xp ⊕ xp+t1 ⊕ xp+t2 ⊕ . . .⊕ xp+tl
= c0xp ⊕ c1xp+1 ⊕ . . .⊕ cτ−2xp+τ−2 ⊕ cτ−1xp+τ−1,
(1)
where xp, ci ∈ {0, 1}; p ∈ N ; i = 0, 1, . . . , τ − 1; ci∈{0, t1, t2, ..., tl} = 1.
2
In linear algebra the next element of PRS xp+τ is calculated as the following
multiplication:
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
xp+1
xp+2
· · · · · ·
xp+τ−1
xp+τ
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
⊤
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
0 1 . . . . . . 0 0
. . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . . . . 1 0
0 0 . . . . . . 0 1
c0 c1 . . . . . . cτ−2 cτ−1
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
⊤
·
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
xp
xp+1
· · · · · ·
xp+τ−2
xp+τ−1
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
⊤
.
When the described attack is performed the conditions arise for PRS modi-
fication or its repeated generation. The effect of repeated generation of a site of
PRS is explained by means of Fig. 1 (the forming polynomial: D(χ) = χ4+χ+1;
the characteristic equation: xp+4 = xp+1 ⊕ xp; the initial conditions: xp = 1,
xp+1 = 0, xp+2 = 1, xp+3 = 0 ).
Thus, those attacks, which are based on creating the conditions under which
mass hardware errors occur, are threatening for MDP. One of the ways of solving
this problem is development of methods for increasing the reliability of the
functioning of sites of data protection tools, mostly subjected to attacks oft he
described type, in particular the sites of forming of the encryption algorithm
(cipher), based on PRS generation.
3. Analysis of methods for reliable binary PRS generation
Currently the required level of functional reliability of the sites of binary PRS
generation is reached both by using of excessive devices (reservation) and timely
excess by various repetitions of the calculations. In digital schemotechnics there
are solutions known, based on use of methods of error-correction coding [4]. In
order to use those methods for PRS generators it is necessary preliminary to
solve the issue multisequencing the process of PRS calculations. The solution
is based on the use of classic parallel algorithms of recursion [10].
For example, for the characteristic equation:
xp+τ = xp+t ⊕ xp, (2)
corresponding to treen D(χ) = χτ + χt + 1, it is possible to build a system of
characteristic equations:


xq, τ−1 = xq−1, τ−1 ⊕ xq−1, τ+t−1,
xq, τ−2 = xq−1, τ−2 ⊕ xq−1, τ+t−2,
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
xq, 1 = xq−1, 1 ⊕ xq−1, t+1,
xq, 0 = xq−1, 0 ⊕ xq−1, t.
3
№ xp+3 xp+2 xp+1 xp Error PRS Correct PRS
0 0 1 0 //
⊕
1oo
Output // 1 oo //❴❴❴❴❴❴❴❴ 1
1 1 0 1 //
⊕
Error (inversion)
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
tt❤ ❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤
0oo
Output // 0 oo //❴❴❴❴❴❴❴❴ 0
2 ¬1
!!❉
❉
❉
❉
1 0 //
⊕
1oo
Output // 1 oo //❴❴❴❴❴❴❴❴ 1
3 1 ¬1
!!❉
❉
❉
❉
1 //
⊕
0oo
Output // 0 oo //❴❴❴❴❴❴❴❴ 0
4 1 1 ¬1
''P
PP
PP
PP
P
//⊕
tt❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤ 1
oo Output // 1 oo //❴❴❴❴❴❴❴❴ 1
5 ¬0
!!❉
❉
❉
❉
1 1 //
⊕
tt❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤ ¬1
oo Output // 0
  
@@✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
1
6 ¬0
!!❉
❉
❉
❉
¬0
!!❉
❉
❉
❉
1 //
⊕
1oo
Output // 1
  
@@✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
1
7 0 ¬0
!!❉
❉
❉
❉
¬0 //
''P
PP
PP
PP
P
⊕
tt❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤ 1
oo Output // 1
  
@@✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
1
8 ¬1
!!❉
❉
❉
❉
0 ¬0 //
''P
PP
PP
PP
P
⊕
tt❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤ ¬0
oo Output // 1
  
@@✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
0
9 0
!!❉
❉
❉
❉
❉
❉ ¬1
!!❉
❉
❉
❉
0 //
⊕
tt❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤ ¬0
oo Output // 1
  
@@✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
0
10 ¬0
!!❉
❉
❉
❉
0
!!❉
❉
❉
❉
❉
❉ ¬1 //
''P
PP
PP
PP
P
⊕
tt❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤ 0
oo Output // 0
  
@@✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
0
11 ¬1
!!❉
❉
❉
❉
¬0
!!❉
❉
❉
❉
0 //
''P
PP
PP
PP
PP
⊕
tt❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤ ¬1
oo Output // 0
  
@@✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
1
12 ¬1
!!❉
❉
❉
❉
¬1
!!❉
❉
❉
❉
¬0 //
''P
PP
PP
PP
P
⊕
0oo
Output // 0
  
@@✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
0
13 0 ¬1
!!❉
❉
❉
❉
¬1 //
''P
PP
PP
PP
P
⊕
tt❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤ ¬0
oo Output // 1
  
@@✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
0
14 1
!!❉
❉
❉
❉
❉
❉ 0 ¬1 //
''P
PP
PP
PP
P
⊕
tt❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤ ¬1
oo Output // 0
  
@@✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
1
kk❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
15 ¬0
!!❉
❉
❉
❉
1
!!❉
❉
❉
❉
❉
❉ 0 //
⊕
tt❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤
❤ ❤ ¬1
oo Output // 0
  
@@✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
1
16 ¬1 ¬0 1 //
⊕
0oo
Output // 0
  
@@✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
0
Figure 1: Example of operation of the LFSR when an error occurs (¬x — logical inversion x)
Similarly, for the general equation (1):

xq, τ−1 = c
(τ−1)
0 xq−1, 0 ⊕ c
(τ−1)
1 xq−1, 1 ⊕ . . .⊕ c
(τ−1)
τ−2 xq−1, τ−2 ⊕ c
(τ−1)
τ−1 xq−1, τ−1,
xq, τ−2 = c
(τ−2)
0 xq−1, 0 ⊕ c
(τ−2)
1 xq−1, 1 ⊕ . . .⊕ c
(τ−2)
τ−2 xq−1, τ−2 ⊕ c
(τ−2)
τ−1 xq−1, τ−1,
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
xq, 1 = c
(1)
0 xq−1, 0 ⊕ c
(1)
1 xq−1, 1 ⊕ . . .⊕ c
(1)
τ−2xq−1, τ−2 ⊕ c
(1)
τ−1xq−1, τ−1,
xq, 0 = c
(0)
0 xq−1, 0 ⊕ c
(0)
1 xq−1, 1 ⊕ . . .⊕ c
(0)
τ−2xq−1, τ−2 ⊕ c
(0)
τ−1xq−1, τ−1,
(3)
4
where c
(j)
i ∈ {0, 1} (i, j = 0, 1, . . . , τ − 1). The principle of parallel lasing
elements PRS based on (3) is illustrated by a graph (see Fig. 2)
Output (q) PRS block xq, τ−1 xq, τ−2 . . . . . . xq, 1 xq, 0
Step q
⊕
OO
⊕
OO
. . . . . .
⊕
OO
⊕
OO
Input (q − 1) PRS block xq−1, τ−1
×c
(τ−1)
τ−1
OO
×c
(τ−1)
τ−2
✑✑✑✑✑✑✑✑✑
HH✑✑✑✑✑✑✑✑✑✑✑✑✑✑✑✑✑✑✑✑✑
×c
(τ−1)
1
<<③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③③
×c
(τ−1)
0sssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss
99ssssssssssssssss
xq−1, τ−2
×c
(τ−2)
τ−2
OO
×c
(τ−2)
τ−1✲✲✲✲✲✲✲✲✲✲✲✲✲✲✲✲✲✲✲✲✲✲✲✲✲
VV✲✲✲✲✲✲
×c
(τ−2)
1✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞
CC✞✞✞✞✞✞✞
×c
(τ−2)
0④④④④④④④④④④
==④④④④④④④④④④④④④④④④④④④④④④④④④④④④④④④④④
. . . . . . xq−1, 1
×c
(1)
1
OO
×c
(1)
τ−2✼✼✼✼✼✼✼
[[✼✼✼✼✼✼✼✼✼✼✼✼✼✼✼✼✼✼✼✼✼✼✼✼✼✼✼✼
×c
(1)
τ−1❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉
bb❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉❉
×c
(1)
0✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓
II✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓✓
xq−1, 0
×c
(0)
0
OO
×c
(0)
1✰✰✰✰✰✰
UU✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰✰
×c
(τ−2)
0 ❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈
aa❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈❈
×c
(τ−1)
0 ❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑
ee❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑
Figure 2: Graph generating elements parallel PRS based on (3)
System (3) forms an information matrix:
GInf =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
c
(τ−1)
0 c
(τ−1)
1 . . . . . . c
(τ−1)
τ−2 c
(τ−1)
τ−1
c
(τ−2)
0 c
(τ−2)
1 . . . . . . c
(τ−2)
τ−2 c
(τ−2)
τ−1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c
(1)
0 c
(1)
1 . . . . . . c
(1)
τ−2 c
(1)
τ−1
c
(0)
0 c
(0)
1 . . . . . . c
(0)
τ−2 c
(0)
τ−1
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
⊤
.
Thus we obtain the q-th block of the PRS:
Xq = GInf ·Xq−1,
where
Xq =
[
xq, τ−1 xq, τ−2 . . . xq, 1 xq, 0
]⊤
,
Xq−1 =
[
xq−1, τ−1 xq−1, τ−2 . . . xq−1, 1 xq−1, 0
]⊤
.
To create the conditions for the application of separable linear redundant
code will get form a matrix GGen, consisting of the information and the check
5
matrix by adding (3) validation expressions:


xq, τ−1 = c
(τ−1)
0 xq−1, 0 ⊕ c
(τ−1)
1 xq−1, 1 ⊕ . . .⊕ c
(τ−1)
τ−2 xq−1, τ−2 ⊕ c
(τ−1)
τ−1 xq−1, τ−1,
xq, τ−2 = c
(τ−2)
0 xq−1, 0 ⊕ c
(τ−2)
1 xq−1,1 ⊕ . . .⊕ c
(τ−2)
τ−2 xq−1, τ−2 ⊕ c
(τ−2)
τ−1 xq−1, τ−1,
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
xq, 1 = c
(1)
0 xq−1, 0 ⊕ c
(1)
1 xq−1, 1 ⊕ . . .⊕ c
(1)
τ−2xq−1, τ−2 ⊕ c
(1)
τ−1xq−1, τ−1,
xq, 0 = c
(0)
0 xq−1, 0 ⊕ c
(0)
1 xq−1, 1 ⊕ . . .⊕ c
(0)
τ−2xq−1, τ−2 ⊕ c
(0)
τ−1xq−1, τ−1,
x∗q, r−1 = a
(r−1)
0 xq−1, 0 ⊕ a
(r−1)
1 xq−1, 1 ⊕ . . .⊕ a
(r−1)
τ−2 xq−1, τ−2 ⊕ a
(r−1)
τ−1 xq−1, r−1,
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
x∗q, 0 = a
(0)
0 xq−1, 0 ⊕ a
(0)
1 xq−1, 1 ⊕ . . .⊕ a
(0)
τ−2xq−1, τ−2 ⊕ a
(0)
τ−1xq−1, τ−1,
where r — the number of redundant symbols used linear code, a
(j)
i ∈ {0, 1}
(i = 0, 1, . . . , τ − 1; j = 0, . . . , r − 1).
A generator matrix takes the form:
GGen =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
c
(τ−1)
0 c
(τ−1)
1 . . . . . . c
(τ−1)
τ−2 c
(τ−1)
τ−1
c
(τ−2)
0 c
(τ−2)
1 . . . . . . c
(τ−2)
τ−2 c
(τ−2)
τ−1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c
(1)
0 c
(1)
1 . . . . . . c
(1)
τ−2 c
(1)
τ−1
c
(0)
0 c
(0)
1 . . . . . . c
(0)
τ−2 c
(0)
τ−1
a
(r−1)
0 a
(r−1)
1 . . . . . . a
(r−1)
τ−2 a
(r−1)
τ−1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a
(0)
0 a
(0)
1 . . . . . . a
(0)
τ−2 a
(0)
τ−1
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
⊤
.
Then the q-th block of the PRS with the control numbers (linear block code):
X∗q =
[
xq, τ−1 xq, τ−2 . . . xq, 1 xq, 0 x
∗
q, r−1 . . . x
∗
q, 0
]⊤
is calculated by:
X∗q = GGen ·Xq−1.
Procedure error-correcting decoding is performed using the known rules [4].
The application of linear redundant codes and methods “hot” standby is not the
only option for the implementation of functional diagnostics and fault tolerance
of digital devices. Example graph parallel generation elements PRS error control
computations is shown in Fig. 3.
Important advantages for these purposes have redundant arithmetic codes,
in particular, so-called AN -codes and residue number systems (RNS) codes.
The application of these codes to monitor logical data types and fault tolerance
implementing devices became possible with the introduction of logical oper-
ations arithmetic expressions [11], in particular linear numerical polynomials
(LNP) and modular forms [12].
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xq−1, 1
OO ::✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉
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⊕
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Figure 3: a) Example graph parallel generation elements PRS (the characteristic equation:
xp+4 = xp+1 ⊕ xp) error control computations (parity control); b) Numerical example
4. Error control operation of the PRS generators, based on “arith-
metization” logical account
At the end of the last century there was formed a new direction parallel
logic computation by the arithmetic (numeric) polynomials [11]. In particular
received position “Modular arithmetic parallel logic computation” of the unifi-
cation of the theoretical foundations of RNS [13, 14, 15] and theoretical foun-
dations of parallel logic computation by the arithmetic of polynomials. The
objective of the Association is to use advantages of RNS, i.e. parallelization
arithmetic, error control calculations [16] in real time and ensure high avail-
ability of computing equipment, in the field of parallel logical account. In the
following, these provisions were developed in various aspects, in particular, to-
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wards the implementation of cryptographic functions [17, 18]. In particular, it
was considered parallel generators PRS based, in General, nonlinear (canonical)
arithmetic polynomials. Using use of LNP proposed by prof. V.D. Malyugin
[11] for the construction of parallel generators PRS possible to reduce the max-
imum length of realizing polynomial to a value of n+ 1, where n — number of
arguments of a Boolean function implemented [18]. In this paper, this method
is used as the basis for the construction of safe (self-checking, fault-tolerant)
generators on the basis of the excess bandwidth RNS.
It is known [19] that the q-th block of land PRS can be represented by a
single LNP. The system of characteristic equations (3) must submit, as a system
of Boolean functions, which in turn must be converted into a system:


Lτ−1(Xq−1) = g
(τ−1)
1 xq−1, 0 + g
(τ−1)
2 xq−1, 1 + . . .+ g
(τ−1)
τ xq−1, τ−1,
Lτ−2(Xq−1) = g
(τ−2)
1 xq−1, 0 + g
(τ−2)
2 xq−1, 1 + . . .+ g
(τ−2)
τ xq−1, τ−1,
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
L0(Xq−1) = g
(0)
1 xq−1, 0 + g
(0)
2 xq−1, 1 + . . .+ g
(0)
τ xq−1, τ−1,
where g
(i)
j (here and then) takes the value “0” or “1” depending on the entry in
the i-th LNP xq−1, j ; i, j = 0, 1, . . . , τ − 1.
The result of the calculation of i-LNP system appears to be a binary word
of length li = ⌊log(
0∑
j=τ−1
g
(i)
j )⌋+1, where ⌊a⌋ — the largest integer. Calculated
total LNP:
L(Xq−1) = Lτ−1(Xq−1) + 2
γ1Lτ−2(Xq−1) + . . .+ 2
γτ−1L0(Xq−1) =
= g
(τ−1)
1 xq−1, 0 + g
(τ−1)
2 xq−1, 1 + . . .+ g
(τ−1)
τ xq−1, τ−1+
+ 2γ1(g
(τ−2)
1 xq−1, 0 + g
(τ−2)
2 xq−1, 1 + . . .+ g
(τ−2)
τ xq−1, τ−1) + . . .
. . .+ 2γτ−1(g
(0)
1 xq−1, 0 + g
(0)
2 xq−1, 1 + . . .+ g
(0)
τ xq−1, τ−1) =
= h1xq−1, 0 + h2xq−1, 1 + . . .+ hτxq−1, τ−1,
where γk =
k−1∑
i=0
(li + 1), k = 1, 2, . . . , τ − 1; hj ∈ Z, or
L(Xq−1) =
τ∑
i=1
hixq−1, i−1. (4)
The final result is formed by implementing operator masking Ξϕ{U}, which
is used to determine the values of the ϕ-th Boolean function representation
U = (bv . . . bϕ . . . b2b1)2 (record (. . .)2 means representing a non-negative U in a
binary number), that is Ξϕ{U} = bϕ. Count calculation LNP (4) is represented
in figure 3.
In RNS a nonnegative coefficient LNP (4) hj is uniquely represented by a
set of residues on the grounds RNS (m1, m2, . . . , mn < mn+1 < . . . < mk —
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pairwise simple):
hj = (α1, α2, . . . , αn, αn+1, . . . , αk)MA, (5)
where αt = |hj |mt ; t = 1, 2, . . . , n, . . . , k; |  |m — the smallest non-negative
deduction number  on the modulo m. Operating range Mn = m1m2 . . .mn
must meet Mn > 2
s, where s =
∑
1≤ε≤τ
lε — the number of binary bits required
to represent the result of a calculation LNP (4).
The remains α1, α2, . . . , αn are informational, and αn+1, . . . , αk — are
control. RNS in this case is called the extended and covers the complete set of
states represented all k residues. This area is full range RNS [0, Mk), where
Mk = m1m2 . . .mnmn+1 . . .mk, and consists of the operating range [0, Mn),
defined information bases RNS, and range identified redundant bases [Mn, Mk),
unacceptable region for the results of a calculation. This means that operations
on numbers hj are in the range [0, Mk). Therefore, if the result of the operation
RNS beyond Mn, it should output error calculation.
Consider RNS specified grounds m1, m2, . . . , mn, mn+1. Each coefficient
LNP hj can be written as (5) and get redundant code RNS represented by the
LNP system:


U (1) = L(1)(Xq−1) = α
(1)
1 xq−1,0 + α
(1)
2 xq−1,1 + . . .+ α
(1)
τ xq−1,τ−1,
U (2) = L(2)(Xq−1) = α
(2)
1 xq−1,0 + α
(2)
2 xq−1,1 + . . .+ α
(2)
τ xq−1,τ−1,
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
U (n) = L(n)(Xq−1) = α
(n)
1 xq−1,0 + α
(n)
2 xq−1,1 + . . .+ α
(n)
τ xq−1,τ−1,
U (n+1) = L(n+1)(Xq−1) = α
(n+1)
1 xq−1,0 + α
(n+1)
2 xq−1,1 + . . .
. . .+ α
(n+1)
τ xq−1,τ−1.
(6)
Substituting in (6) values of RNS residue on the appropriate grounds for each
coefficient (4) and the values of the variables xq−1, 0, . . . , xq−1, τ−1, get the
values of LNP system (6), where U (1), U (2), . . . , U (n), U (n+1) — nonnegative
integer. In accordance with the Chinese remainder theorem solve the system of
equations: 

U∗ = |U (1)|m1 ,
U∗ = |U (2)|m2 ,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U∗ = |U (n)|mn ,
U∗ = |U (n+1)|mn+1 .
(7)
Since m1, m2, . . . , mn, mn+1 are pairwise prime, then the only solution of
(7) gives the expression:
U∗ =
∣∣∣∣∣
n+1∑
s=1
Ms, n+1µs, n+1U
(s)
∣∣∣∣∣
Mn+1
, (8)
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where Ms, n+1 =
Mn+1
ms
, µs, n+1 = |M
−1
s, n+1|ms , Mn+1 =
n+1∏
s=1
ms.
Graph parallel generation PRS based on (8) is shown in Fig. 4. The occur-
rence of the result of the calculation (8) in the range (control expression):
0 ≤ U∗ < Mn,
means the absence of detectable errors of calculations.
xq, τ−1 xq, τ−2 . . . . . . xq−1, 0
Ξ(τ−1)
OO
Ξ(τ−2)
OO
. . . . . . Ξ(0)
OO
OO OO
U∗
OO
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Figure 4: Graph of parallel generation PRS based on the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT)
5. Reconfiguration of equipment
Restore reliable operation of the generator of the PRS in the case of long-
term failure is possible by correcting an error or reconfiguration of equipment
generator (active redundancy). The first option is unacceptable because it does
not guarantee no penetration of undetectable errors in the result of the encryp-
tion. By methods of modular redundant coding is made possible to apply a
variant of the reconfiguration of the equipment by excluding from the operation
of the failed equipment.
After localization of the faulty equipment — for example — a single channel
operation RNS, the reconfiguration operation is performed by the calculation
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U∗ from the system:


U∗ = |U (1)|m1 ,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U∗ = |U (n)|mn ,
U∗ = |U (n+1)|mn+1 ,
U∗ = |U (n+2)|mn+2
on the “right” reasons of residue number systems:
U∗ = |U˜ (1)B1, j + U˜
(2)B2, j + . . .+ U˜
(n+2)Bn+2, j |Mj ,
where U˜ (i) — wrong balance; Bi, j — orthogonal bases; i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n+ 2;
i 6= j; Bi, j =
Mjµi, j
mi
; Mj =
Mn+2
mj
; µi, j is calculated from the comparison:
Mjµi, j
mi
≡ 1 (mod mi). Compiled table 1 contains the values of the orthogonal
bases and modules of the system for the occurrence of a single error for each
base RNS.
Table 1: Calculation table orthogonally bases and modules RNS
j B1, j B2, j · · · Bn+2, j Mj
1 0
M1µ2, 1
m2
· · ·
M1µn+2, 1
mn+2
m2m3 . . .mn+2
2
M2µ1, 2
m1
0 · · ·
M2µn+2, 2
mn+2
m1m3 . . .mn+2
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
n+ 2
Mn+2µ1, n+2
m1
Mn+2µ2, n+2
m2
· · · 0 m1m2 . . .mn+1
6. Conclusion
It is known that the use of RNS already with two redundant bases allows us
to provide a level of fault tolerance modular transmitter exceeds the tolerance
provided by the method of rorovana equipment. This redundant hardware costs
are reduced from 200% (triple) up to 30-40% (when using RNS) [20]. At the
same time it should be noted that the amount of hardware, PRS generator
operating in accordance obtained by the method, may exceed the hardware
failover LFSR, built in accordance with traditional solutions. So you should
made a fundamentally new level of functional flexibility of the designed generator
PRS is able to implement and many other cryptographic functions, time-varying,
without rebuilding the structure. This allows for the implementation of the
device not only programmable logic integrated circuit, but also high-tech large
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custom integrated circuits, in particular used for the implementation of number
theoretic transformations in the field of digital signal processing.
The implementation of the PRS generators using LNP and redundant RNS
allows to obtain a new class of solutions aimed at the safe implementation of
the logical cryptographic functions, in particular parallel generators PRS. This
is provided as a functional control equipment (in real time), and its fault tol-
erance through reconfiguration of the structure of the evaluator in the process
of its degradation. Classic LFSR considered in the present work, is the basis
and more complex, for example, combining generators PRS. Use for the imple-
mentation of the PRS generator modular arithmetic provides the possibility of
applying the proposed solutions in the hybrid cryptosystems (including asym-
metric) [18]. When this arithmetic calculator that supports the implementation
of asymmetric cryptographic algorithms may be used to implement systems of
Boolean functions (elements PRS).
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